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Abstract
We investigate unemployment due to mismatch in the US over the past three
decades. We propose an accounting framework that allows us to estimate the over-
all amount of mismatch unemployment, as well as the contribution of each of the
frictions that caused the mismatch. Mismatch is quantitatively important for un-
employment and the cyclical behavior of mismatch unemployment is very similar
to that of the overall unemployment rate. Geographic mismatch is driven primarily
by wage frictions. Mismatch across industries is driven by wage frictions as well as
barriers to job mobility. We nd virtually no role for worker mobility frictions.
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1 Introduction
After the end of the Great Recession in December 2007, unemployment in the United
States remained high for more than half a decade. One explanation that was suggested
is a mismatch in the skills or geographic location of the available jobs and workers, a
view that seemed to be supported by a decline in aggregate matching e¢ ciency (Elsby,
Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010), Barnichon and Figura (2010)) and geographic mobility (Frey
(2009)). There was, however, little empirical work using disaggregated data to either
support or reject this hypothesis.
In this paper, we estimate mismatch unemployment on the US labor market, study
its evolution over time and explore what frictions caused mismatch to arise. To do so,
we use an accounting framework that puts just enough structure on the data to allow
us to quantify the sources of mismatch unemployment.
Our accounting framework models the labor market as consisting of multiple sub-
markets or segments. Mismatch is dened as dispersion in labor market conditions, in
particular the job nding rate, across labor market segments. Within segments, frictions
prevent the instantaneous matching of unemployed workers to vacant jobs, resulting in
search unemployment in the tradition of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pis-
sarides (1985). Across segments, frictions generate dispersion in labor market conditions,
which gives rise to mismatch unemployment. There are four types of frictions that gen-
erate mismatch: worker mobility costs, job mobility costs, wage setting frictions and
heterogeneity in matching e¢ ciency. Figure 1 visualizes the framework.
The data required to estimate mismatch unemployment and its sources using our
approach, are job and worker nding rates, and worker and job surplus by labor market
segments, which we operationalize as states or industries. We construct these variables
over the 1979-2009 period using data on worker ows and wages from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) and data on prots from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA).
Consistent with other recent studies, we argue that mismatch is an important rea-
son for unemployment. A back-of-the-envelope calculation correcting our estimates for
aggregation bias suggests that mismatch is responsible for a large part of both the level
and the uctuations in the unemployment rate. The cyclical behavior of mismatch un-
employment is very similar to that of the overall unemployment rate. This nding is
driven by the fact that dispersion in labor market conditions across states and industries
moves closely with the business cycle, similar to what Abraham and Katz (1986) docu-
mented over two decades ago.1 The unemployment that derives from this dispersion is
as cyclical as the overall unemployment rate and no more persistent. As a corollary, the
nature of the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession was no di¤erent from
1 In response to the structural shifts view of recessions put forward by Lilien (1982), which holds that
recessions are periods of reallocation between industries akin to mismatch, Abraham and Katz showed
that aggregate shocks can give rise to countercyclical uctuations in dispersion of employment growth
across sectors.
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previous recessions, although it was of course more severe.2 We nd no evidence that
mismatch unemployment is structural, in the sense that it would not be not responsive
to stabilization policy.3
Our most interesting and novel set of results concerns the sources of labor market
mismatch. We nd that most mismatch is caused by dispersion in the share of surplus
that goes to workers, i.e. by wage setting frictions. Industries and states with high
wages tend to have low prots. This implies that those states and industries that are
attractive to workers are unattractive to rms, and vice versa. Little or no mismatch is
due to worker mobility frictions. These conclusions are based on the testing the strong
predictions generated by our framework for the patterns we should observe in the data
in the absence of the various frictions that can give rise to mismatch. In particular,
if there are no barriers to worker mobility, a no-arbitrage condition dictates that we
should see a negative correlation between wages (measuring how attractive it is to have
a job in a given state or industry) and job nding rates (how hard it is to nd these
jobs). In the data, we nd that deviations from this correlation are small and non-
systematic. An implication of these results is that policies aimed at increasing worker
mobility, as advocated e.g. by Katz (2010), are likely to have small e¤ects and may even
be counterproductive.
The detailed empirical analysis we provide, indicates that it is fruitful to think of
mismatch as a possible micro-foundation for unemployment. In most modern macro-
economic models of the labor market there is unemployment because of search frictions.
But the micro-foundations for search frictions and the aggregate matching function are
not very well developed. If unemployment is truly due to a time cost of search, it seems
there should be a secular downward trend in the unemployment rate as computers and
the internet improve the search technology available to rms and workers. Instead,
we think of search frictions as a modeling device that captures the implications of the
costly trading process without the need to make the heterogeneity and the other features
2This result is not inconsistent with observation that there was an outward shift in the Beveridge
curve, the negatively sloped relation between vacancies and unemployment, which indicates a decline
in aggregate matching e¢ ciency and provides much of the basis for the argument that there was an
unprecedented increase in mismatch in the Great Recession (Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010), Lubik
(2013)). While an increase in mismatch indeed reduces matching e¢ ciency (Shimer (2007)), there are
many other causes for shifts in the Beveridge curve as well, including changes in the separation rate and
demographics. Controlling for these factors, the remaining role for mismatch is very small (Barnichon
and Figura (2010)). For the same reason, our ndings are not contradictory with the observation
that exogenous shocks to mismatch are not an important as a source of unemployment uctuations
(Furlanetto and Groshenny (2013)).
3 In the wake of the Great Recession, this was a widely held view, advocated most prominently by
Narayana Kocherlakota (2010), the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, who argued
that it is hard to see how the Fed can do much to cure this problem. Monetary stimulus has provided
conditions so that manufacturing plants want to hire new workers. But the Fed does not have a means
to transform construction workers into manufacturing workers. See Estevão and Tsounta (2011) and
Groshen and Potter (2003) for versions of this argument. Early critics include Krugman (2010), DeLong
(2010), Lazear and Spletzer (2012), and Peter Diamond (2011), who notes in his Nobel lecture that
there is a long history of claims that the latest technological or structural developments make for a
new long-term high level of unemployment, but these have repeatedly been proven wrong. (p.1065).
Kocherlakota later changed his views in light of the evidence (New York Times (2014)).
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that give rise to it explicit(Pissarides (2000, p.4)). Mismatch generates heterogeneity
and therefore gives rise to unemployment. The results in this paper shed light on the
question what are the frictions that give rise to mismatch.4
Previous empirical studies on mismatch tend to focus on shifts in the Beveridge curve,
trying to use aggregate data to estimate matching e¢ ciency (Lipsey (1965), Abraham
(1987), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Barnichon and Figura (2010)) and there is little
recent empirical work using disaggregated data.5 Two recent contributions, however, are
closely related to this paper. S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) use disaggregated
data on unemployment and vacancies to construct indices of mismatch, using data from
the JOLTS and the HWOL for the 2001-2011 and 2005-2011 periods respectively. Bar-
nichon and Figura (2013) use the CPS to explore how much dispersion in labor market
conditions contributes to movements in matching e¢ ciency. Our ndings are consistent
with these papers in terms of the contribution of mismatch across states and industries
to the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession.6 Compared to S¸ahin, Song,
Topa, and Violante (2014), we provide an alternative method to estimate mismatch un-
employment, which gives us a much longer time series. The longer series allows us to
better explore the cyclical behavior of mismatch unemployment. Compared to Barni-
chon and Figura (2013), our focus is on unemployment rather than matching e¢ ciency.
Our main contribution with respect to both papers is the accounting framework that
allows us to decompose mismatch into it sources and to estimate the contribution of
each of these sources to unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the accounting
framework to formalize the sources of dispersion in labor market conditions across sub-
markets of the labor market. We identify four sources of mismatch, three of which we
can estimate: worker mobility costs, job mobility costs and wage setting frictions. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data used in the estimation, and explains in detail how we construct
the empirical counterparts of the variables that dene a labor market segment in our
model. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
4Some recent studies discuss this issue from a theoretical perspective. Shimer (2007) formally shows
that mismatch between the distributions of workers and jobs over segments of the labor market gives rise
to a relation between the job nding probability and labor market tightness that is very similar to the
relation obtained if there are search frictions and an aggregate matching function. Stock-ow matching,
as in Coles, Jones, and Smith (2010), rest unemployment, as in Alvarez and Shimer (2011), reallocation
unemployment as in Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013), Wong (2012) or Chang (2011), and waiting
unemployment as in Birchenall (2011) are all closely related to this concept of unemployment due to
mismatch. As opposed to these studies, the focus of our paper is empirical. One way to think about
the contribution of this paper is to provide a set of facts unemployment that can be used to test the
theoretical models of mismatch unemployment.
5Older studies include work by Padoa Schioppa (1991) and Phelps (1994).
6The nding that geographic mismatch cannot explain why the increase in unemployment in the
Great Recession is so much larger than in previous recessions is also consistent with work by Kaplan
and Schulhofer-Wohl (2011), who show that most of the a drop in interstate migration in the Great
Recession is a statistical artifact.
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2 Accounting Framework
The theoretical framework presented here allows us to formalize the mechanisms, by
which heterogeneity in labor market conditions across submarkets of the labor market
leads to mismatch unemployment. In addition, we use the framework to guide the
empirical exercise how to estimate mismatch unemployment and how to decompose it
into its sources. We try to make as little assumptions as possible. In particular, we
do not assume anything about vacancy creation, but model only the distribution of
vacancies and unemployed workers over submarkets.
Unemployed workers look for jobs, and rms with vacancies look for unemployed
workers on the labor market. But not each unemployed worker can match with each
vacancy. We model this idea as a labor market that is segmented into submarkets. A
submarket is dened as the subset of jobs that a given unemployed worker searches for,
or the subset of unemployed workers that can form a match with a given vacancy. We
assume that there is a one-to-one mapping of the set of workers and rms that search
for each other, ruling out that workers or rms spread out their search e¤ort over several
submarkets.7 In addition, we assume that in each submarket, there is a technology to
match unemployed workers with vacancies.8
Under these assumptions, labor market conditions in a submarket can be completely
characterized by four variables: the probability that an unemployed workers nds a job,
the increase in life-time earnings by a worker who nds a job, the probability that a
vacant job nds a worker, and the increase in life-time prots by a rm that lls a vacant
job. These four variables are the job nding rate fWi , worker surplus S
W
i , the job lling
rate or worker nding rate fFi and job surplus S
F
i in submarket i, respectively.
Any labor market model with a segmented labor market must describe how labor
market conditions are related across submarkets. We show which relations e¤ectively
reduce the segmented labor market to a single market, as in the standard search and
matching model with homogeneous workers and jobs, in the tradition of Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). We take these relations as a benchmark and
explore the e¤ect of deviations from it. Unemployment that results under the benchmark
conditions may be due to a variety of frictions, for instance search frictions. We refer to
this unemployment as frictional. Unemployment that results from deviations from the
benchmark conditions (and is therefore due to dispersion in labor market conditions) is
called mismatch unemployment.
7This assumption is without loss of generality as long as the total amount of search e¤ort is limited.
It is, of course, di¢ cult to operationalize this concept of a submarket empirically. In practice, we use
either states or industries in most of our estimates, which is a much higher level of aggregation compared
to the ideal. In Sections 2.2 and 4.2.1, we discuss how this a¤ects our estimates.
8Our accounting framework is based on worker and job mobility arbitraging away di¤erences in the
value of searching in each submarket. In order for arbitrage to be possible, we need the (plausible)
assumption that the matching technology has positive and diminishing returns in each of its inputs. In
other words, we assume that adding an additional unemployed worker to a submarket, ceteris paribus,
makes it harder for workers to nd jobs and easier for rms to ll vacancies (and similar for adding an
additional vacancy).
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2.1 Benchmark Relations
The relation between the job nding rate fWi and worker surplus S
W
i across submarkets
is determined by assumptions about worker mobility between submarkets, the relation
between the worker nding rate fFi and job surplus S
F
i by assumptions about job mobil-
ity (mobility of vacancies), the relation between worker and job surplus by assumptions
about wage determination, and the relation between job and workers nding rates by
assumptions about the matching technology. These four relations, which are summa-
rized in Figure 1, fully determine conditions in submarkets of the labor market. We now
discuss each of these four relations in turn.
2.1.1 Worker Mobility
An unemployed worker, searching for a job in submarket i, receives an unemployment
benet bWi (which, as usual, includes the utility from leisure). With probability f
W
i , this
worker nds a job, in which case she receives the worker surplus SWi from the match.
Thus, the per-period value of searching for a job in submarket i, assuming it is constant
over time, is given by zWi = b
W
i + f
W
i S
W
i .
9
If workers may freely decide in which submarket to search, i.e. if there are no
barriers to worker mobility, it must be that the value of searching is equalized across
submarkets, so that zWi = z
W for all i. Using a bar over a variable to denote its
mean over all submarkets and a hat to denote relative deviations from this mean, e.g.
f^Wi =
 
fWi   fW

= fW , equalization of the value of searching in all submarkets implies
the following relation between fWi and S
W
i , which we label the worker mobility curve.
10
f^Wi + S^
W
i =  
bW
zW   bW b^
W
i (1)
Assuming unemployment benets are the same in all submarkets, we get f^Wi =  S^Wi .
The worker mobility curve is a no-arbitrage condition. It states that attractive jobs
must be hard, and unattractive jobs easy to nd, in order for workers to be indi¤erent
which job they search for.11 If unemployment benets di¤er across submarkets, then
submarkets with high unemployment benets must have low job nding rates or low
worker surplus or both.
If there are barriers to worker mobility, for example because it is costly to move
9The assumption that zWi is in steady state seems reasonable, because average unemployment dura-
tion, compared to the length of a typical business cycle, is short in the US.
10The condition is exact for log-deviations but only a rst-order approximation for relative deviations
from the mean. The same caveat applies to conditions (3), (4) and (5) below. The reason we nevertheless
prefer relative deviations is because empirically log-deviations are problematic in the (rare) cases that
variables are negative.
11The insight is the same as that of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model of rural-urban migration.
In the context of worker mobility, it should not be surprising that some (urban) areas have much
lower job nding rates (higher unemployment) if wages are much higher there. Similarly, Montgomery
(1991) prosposes di¤erences in job nding rates as an explanation for persistent wage di¤erentials across
industries.
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from one state to another, or because moving into a di¤erent industry requires costly
retraining, then there may be di¤erences in the value of searching across submarkets.
We denote these di¤erences by WMi , so that the worker mobility curve is given by
f^Wi + S^
W
i = 
WM
i (2)
If unemployment benets are the same across submarkets, the dispersion in WMi is a
measure of worker mobility costs. If the di¤erence in the value of searching in a particular
submarket i becomes to high compared to the average, it becomes worthwhile for workers
to pay the mobility cost and move into that submarket. Unemployed workers moving
into market i make it harder to nd a job in that submarket, reducing fWi and therefore
WMi . If unemployment benets vary across submarkets, then di¤erences in the value of
searching may also reect di¤erences in unemployment benets, WMi =  
bW
zW bW b^
W
i .
2.1.2 Job Mobility
Having a vacancy looking for a worker in submarket i yields the rm bFi , which may be
a negative number, i.e. vacancy posting costs. With probability fFi , this vacancy gets
lled, in which case the rm gets surplus SFi from the match. Thus, the (steady state)
per-period value of searching for a worker in submarket i is given by zFi = b
F
i + f
F
i S
F
i .
If rms can freely relocate vacancies across submarkets, no-arbitrage requires that
the value of searching for a worker must be equal across submarkets. Analogous to
the worker mobility curve, we get a job mobility curve, which states that jobs that are
attractive to rms must be hard to ll. If there are barriers to job mobility, these give
rise to di¤erences in the value of a vacancy across submarkets.
f^Fi + S^
F
i = 
JM
i (3)
Dispersion in JMi may reect job mobility costs and/or dispersion in vacancy posting
costs, JMi =  
bF
zF bF b^
F
i .
2.1.3 Wage Determination
The relation between worker and rm surplus is determined by assumptions on how
worker and rm divide the total surplus from their match. The instrument that is used
to divide the surplus is the wage. In our benchmark relation, which is the only relation
that does not give rise to any mismatch, rm and worker share the surplus in xed
proportions across segments. This relation would be true in standard labor market
models, which commonly assume that wages are set by generalized Nash bargaining.
Here, however, we are not making any specic assumptions on the wage determination
process, but merely stating a benchmark relation for surplus sharing that does not give
rise to mismatch.
If the share of match surplus that goes to the worker i, often referred to as the
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workers bargaining power, is constant across submarkets, then worker and job surplus
are proportional across submarkets, S^Wi = S^
J
i . In general, wages may deviate from this
benchmark relation, for example because bargaining power varies across segments or
because wages are not rebargained in each period. This is captured by deviations from
the wage determination curve.
S^Wi = S^
F
i + 
WD
i (4)
Dispersion in WDi may reect wage bargaining costs or heterogeneity in workers bar-
gaining power, WDi =
di
1 i , but may also reect that wages are determined by a
completely di¤erent mechanism than bargaining. In the interest of brevity, we refer to
deviations from the benchmark wage determination curve as evidence for wage setting
frictions.
2.1.4 Matching Technology
The nal relation needed to close the model, between worker and job nding rates,
is determined by assumptions on the matching technology. In our benchmark rela-
tion, the probability that workers nd jobs and the probability that rms nd workers
are inversely log-proportional. This is true, for instance, if matches are formed from
unemployed workers and vacancies through a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
matching function. Under this assumption, the worker and job nding rates are both
iso-elastic functions of the vacancy-unemployment ratio i, often referred to as labor
market tightness, fFi = Bi
 
i and f
W
i = Bi
1 
i , where  is the elasticity of unem-
ployment in the matching function and Bi is matching e¢ ciency. This gives rise to the
following curve, describing the matching process.
f^Fi =  

1  f^
W
i + 
MT
i (5)
Dispersion in MTi reects dispersion in matching e¢ ciency across submarkets, 
MT
i =
B^i
1  . If the elasticity of the matching function is not constant across submarkets, then
the above relation still holds in rst order approximation, and MTi reects all di¤erences
in the matching function across submarkets, MTi =
B^i
1    1 
 
fW   fF  ^i.
Our data do not allow us to test the benchmark relation on the matching technology.
Therefore, in the empirical work we will assume that MTi = 0 for all i. There is some
evidence from other data sources that this assumption may not be too far from the truth
(S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014)), see Section 3.2 for a short discussion. In the
description of the framework in this section, we will allow for MTi to be non-zero for
completeness.
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2.2 Mismatch Unemployment
Combine equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) to solve for the distribution of job nding rates
across segments.
f^Wi = (1  )
 
WMi   JMi   WDi + MTi

(6)
Note that the benchmark relations were dened so that only deviations from these equa-
tions give rise to dispersion in labor market conditions. If there is perfect worker mobil-
ity, perfect job mobility, wages are set to share match surplus in constant proportions,
and there is a matching function with constant matching e¢ ciency, then labor market
conditions are identical in all submarkets: setting WMi = 
JM
i = 
WD
i = 
MF
i = 0 in
equation (6) gives f^Wi = 0 or f
W
i =
fW for all i. Substituting back into the various
equations, it is straightforward to show that the worker nding rate, and worker and rm
surplus are equalized as well. In this case, the model reduces to a standard labor market
model, in which we can e¤ectively think of the labor market as a single, unsegmented
market. Unemployment in this case is entirely due to frictions within submarkets, e.g.
search frictions.
Dispersion in labor market conditions generates unemployment because the job nd-
ing rate is concave in labor market tightness. Therefore, the distribution of vacancies
and unemployed workers that results in the highest aggregate job nding rate, keep-
ing xed the total number of vacancies and unemployed, is to equalize labor market
tightness over submarkets. To formalize this, consider a mean-preserving change in the
distribution of labor market tightness from i to 0i. The counterfactual unemployment
rate uCF that prevails under the new distribution is given by,
uCF
u
'
fW
fW;CF
=
0BB@E

1 + f^W;CFi
 1
1 

E

1 + f^Wi
 1
1 

1CCA
1 
/ V

CFi =
CF

V

i=
 (7)
where 0 <  < 1 is the elasticity of unemployment in the matching function. See
appendix A for the derivation of equation (7). The aggregate job nding rate is higher
and therefore the unemployment rate lower, uCF < u, if and only if the dispersion in
fW;CFi is smaller than the dispersion in f
W
i , in the sense that i is a mean-preserving
spread of CFi (i.e. the distribution of 
CF
i second-order stochastically dominates the
distribution of i).12
To calculate the contribution of mismatch to unemployment, we use the actual job
nding rates for f^Wi and set the counterfactual nding rates f^
W;CF
i = 0 to represent
the full equalization of labor market conditions that would prevail in the absence of
mismatch. Then,
 
u  uCF  =u is the fraction of unemployment that is due to mismatch.
The importance of mismatch estimated in this manner will depend on the time period as
12The rst approximation is just for ease of interpretation. In the empirical work, we calculate the
counterfactual job nding rate using (7) and then calculate the counterfactual steady state unemploy-
ment rate as u = = (+ f).
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well as on the level of disaggregation. Benchmark conditions (2), (3) and (4) assume the
labor market is in steady state. Given the speed of transition dynamics in unemployment
and the fact that we use annual data, we do not expect the results to be a¤ected very
much by this assumption. However, to the extent that some of the adjustment may not
yet have been realized, our estimates provide an upper bound for the amount of mismatch
due to each source. The e¤ect of the level of disaggregation is more important. At higher
levels of aggregation, we would expect to see substantial mismatch within segments,
so that the observed mismatch across segments is a lower bound for the actual labor
market mismatch. We return to this issue in detail when we discuss the overall amount
of mismatch in Section 4.2.1.
2.3 Mismatch Accounting
Deviations from any of the four benchmark relations generate dispersion in labor market
tightness and job nding rates. There are four sources of dispersion across submarkets of
the labor market: WMi represents heterogeneity in unemployment benets and barriers
to worker mobility, JMi heterogeneity in vacancy posting costs and barriers to job mo-
bility, WDi heterogeneity in wage bargaining power or other wage setting frictions, and
MTi heterogeneity in matching e¢ ciency. All four sources lead to unemployed workers
and vacancies being in di¤erent submarkets and thus cause mismatch unemployment.
For example, if WMi > 0, too few unemployed workers are searching for jobs in submar-
ket i, either because unemployment benets are relatively low there or because mobility
costs prevent more unemployed workers from moving into that submarket. If WDi > 0,
too many unemployed workers and too few vacancies are in submarket i, because wages
are higher (and prots lower) than in comparable jobs in other submarkets so that
workers reap a disproportionately large share of match surplus in this submarket.
Equations (6) and (7) allow us to decompose mismatch unemployment into its four
sources. The idea is that if we remove, for example, the worker mobility frictions, setting
WMi = 0, but leave the job mobility frictions, wage setting frictions, and heterogeneity
in matching e¢ ciency in place, then JMi , 
WD
i and 
MT
i would stay the same. Notice
that this is probably not a good assumption for the short run, because worker or job
mobility or wage renegotiations a¤ect equations (2), (3) and (4) simultaneously. In
the long run, however, after many shocks have hit the labor market, we would expect
deviations because of job mobility, wage setting frictions, or heterogeneity in matching
e¢ ciency to be similar to what they were. Thus, the question we can answer is what
unemployment rate would prevail in the long run, if we removed one or more deviations
from the benchmark model.
The procedure to decompose mismatch unemployment into its sources is imple-
mented in three steps. First, we estimate the s using equations (2), (3), (4) and (5)
and data on the surpluses and nding rates (section 3 below describes how we obtain
these data). Second, given estimates for WMi , 
JM
i , 
WD
i and 
MT
i , we use equation (6)
to calculate what the job nding rates in each submarket would be if we set one or more
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of the  s equal to zero. Finally, using equation (7), we calculate the unemployment
rate that would prevail under these scenarios. We refer to this exercise as mismatch
accounting.
The last step of the decomposition is always relative to a baseline level of unemploy-
ment, see equation (7). This means we can always estimate the contribution of each
source in two di¤erent ways, introducing the friction with respect to a baseline, in which
the friction was absent, or removing the friction with respect to a baseline, in which
it was present. In general, the two approaches will give di¤erent answers because the
alphas may be correlated.13 More importantly, the contribution of each friction will
depend on the order in which we introduce or remove the various frictions. In appendix
B, we show that the contribution of a friction that we remove includes the contribution
of the covariance of that friction with other frictions in place, whereas the contribution
of a friction that we introduce does not. Therefore, we calculate the contribution of
each friction in both ways and average it, attributing the covariance between two fric-
tions in equal proportions to each of the frictions. This way, we make sure that our
decomposition adds up to the total amount of mismatch unemployment.
2.4 Discussion
Before turning to the data, we briey discuss a few conceptual issues with the mismatch
accounting procedure and compare our approach to the other studies in the (small)
recent literature on labor market mismatch. First and foremost, we want to emphasize
that we are not taking a stance ex-ante on whether or not we expect the benchmark
conditions on worker mobility (2), job mobility (3), and wage determination (4) to be
satised in the data. These conditions are just benchmark conditions: conditions, under
which labor market conditions are fully equalized across segments. Deviations from the
benchmark conditions represent sources of labor market mismatch.
The benchmark conditions on wage determination (4) and matching technology (5)
are of a di¤erent nature than the conditions for worker mobility (2) and job mobility
(3). The latter are no-arbitrage conditions, and deviations from these conditions have a
straightforward interpretation as evidence for barriers to worker or job mobility across
segments. The interpretation of deviations from the wage determination and matching
technology conditions is less straightforward. Consequently, one could have a semantic
debate whether dispersion in labor market conditions originating from deviations from
these conditions should even be labeled as mismatch. Our pragmatic solution to this
13Note that this also means that removing one or more of these sources of mismatch does not nec-
essarily decrease unemployment as the di¤erent frictions may reinforce or counteract each other. This
result is intuitive. Imagine two otherwise identical submarkets of the labor market, one with high wages
and one with low wages. Suppose these wage di¤erentials can exist because of wage setting frictions,
but that labor market tightness is nevertheless equal in both submarkets, because mobility costs prevent
workers and jobs from moving from one submarket to the other. Now suppose we removed the mobility
costs but left the wage setting frictions in place. Unemployed workers would move to the submarket
where wages are high, whereas vacancies would move to the submarket where wages are low. The result
would be a decrease in the aggregate job nding rate and an increase in structural unemployment. In
the empirical analysis in section 4, we will show that this is in fact a realistic mechanism.
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issue is to dene mismatch as dispersion in labor market conditions for any reason.
Clearly, this choice a¤ects how we interpret our results and we try to be careful about
this issue throughout the paper.
The benchmark conditions for worker and job mobility can be interpreted in various
ways. Our preferred interpretation is as no-arbitrage conditions, because that interpre-
tation allows us to posit the conditions with very little assumptions. However, we could
also think of these conditions as equilibrium conditions in the context of a directed search
model. Yet a di¤erent interpretation of the benchmark conditions is as e¢ ciency condi-
tions. This last interpretation is the one preferred by S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante
(2014), who derive a benchmark condition for a labor market without mismatch, similar
to condition (6), as the rst-order condition of a social planner who is free to move
workers across labor market segments. In this interpretation, we can derive conditions
similar to (2) and (3) if we assume the planner can also move vacancies across segments,
and unemployment benets, vacancy posting costs and matching functions are identical
across labor market segments, but match productivities and job destruction rates are
not. Note that in this case the conditions would of course be in terms of total match
surplus, because the planner could redistribute that surplus between workers and rms.
However, under the Hosios condition, which implies our benchmark wage determination
condition (4), these e¢ ciency conditions and our worker and job mobility conditions (2)
and (3) are identical.
To complete the comparison between the benchmark conditions in this paper and
those in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), we could ask ourselves what happens in
our framework if we assume the distribution of vacancies over labor market segments is
exogenous as in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014). In that case, there is no reason
for job mobility condition (3) to hold. Substituting equal surplus sharing (4) into the job
mobility condition (2), setting the alphas to zero, we obtain a benchmark condition for a
labor market without mismatch similar to the allocation chosen by the planner in S¸ahin,
Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) with heterogeneous productivities and job destruction
rates, equation (2) in their paper. This condition is weaker than condition (6), with all
alphas set to zero, because job mobility, in combination with homogeneous matching
technologies (5), additionally implies that total match surplus is equalized across labor
market segments. This makes sense. If workers are free to move, but vacancies are
stuck in the segment they are in, the value of being unemployed in each segment will
be equalized, but not necessarily the total value of a match. In this case, there may
be dispersion in job nding rates in the benchmark case, so that this dispersion is not
attributed to mismatch. However, if rms are free to move vacancies across segments,
then the value of a vacancy must be equalized as well. If it is further the case that match
surplus accruing to workers and rms is positively related, as condition (4) holds, then
it must be that job nding and job lling rates are (weakly) positively related as well: if
segments that have relatively high worker surplus also have relatively high rm surplus,
both job nding and job lling rates must be relatively low in these segments. Since
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the matching technology implies a (weakly) negative rather than a positive correlation
between job nding and job lling rates, see condition (5), it must be that both job
nding and job lling rates, and therefore also match surplus, are fully equalized across
labor market segments. Therefore, any dispersion in labor market conditions in our
framework will be attributed to mismatch. To summarize: mismatch as dened by
S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) will be attributed to worker mobility or wage
setting frictions in our framework (although S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014)
do not separate the two sources of mismatch), whereas mismatch due to job mobility
frictions will not be picked up by the S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) mismatch
index.
Few assumptions were needed to derive benchmark conditions (2), (3) and (4) so
that the framework so far is quite general (we will need to make many more assump-
tions to operationalize the procedure, which we discuss in the next section). Here, we
highlight two assumptions in particular that do not a¤ect the benchmark conditions.
First, we assumed workers and rms can only search in one labor market segment at
the same moment in time. The benchmark conditions would be unchanged if we relax
this assumption and assume that workers and rms can distribute search e¤ort over
multiple segments, as long as the total amount of search e¤ort is nite, so that more
intensive search in one segment comes at the cost of reduced search intensity in another
segment. However, in this case our approach will overstate the e¤ect of deviations from
the worker mobility conditions for unemployment, as pointed out by Marinescu and
Rathelot (2014). We return to this issue when we discuss the robustness of our results
in Section 4.4.
A second concern we often encounter is how the benchmark conditions would change
in the presence of on-the-job search. On-the-job search does not a¤ect the conditions
in any way, although it will a¤ect the way we operationalize the concept of match
surplus, see Section 3.3 below. The reason is that the benchmark conditions describe
the behavior of unemployed workers, not that of the employed. On a side note: there
may be mismatch of employed workers as well, i.e. mismatch between the skill set of
workers and the skill requirements of the jobs they are employed in, a topic also known
as underemployment or overqualication. This paper does not address this interesting
line of research at all, and we only consider mismatch between unemployed workers and
vacancies.
Finally, a brief comment on the welfare implications of our results. There are none.
The type of mismatch that we consider may be ine¢ cient, e.g. because workers cannot
relocate to segments where there are more vacancies, or e¢ cient, e.g. because workers do
not want to relocate to a di¤erent labor market segment because the ow value of being
unemployed bWi is high in the segment that they are in. Since our approach cannot
distinguish e¢ cient from ine¢ cient mismatch, our results are informative only about
unemployment, not about welfare.
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3 Data and Measurement
To test the relations we derived in the previous section, we need empirical measures of
the job-nding rate fWi , the worker-nding rate f
F
i , worker surplus S
W
i , which is closely
related to wages, and job surplus SFi , closely related to prots, for submarkets of the
labor market. In this section, we describe how we obtain these measures. In section 3.1,
we describe the micro-data we use to extract disaggregated measures for nding rates,
wages and prots. Then, in sections 3.2 and 3.3, we describe how we use these data to
calculate the theoretical measures we need for our accounting exercise. Here, we need to
make some auxiliary assumptions and these sections anticipate a number of robustness
checks, which we will revisit after discussing our results in section 4.4.
The rst empirical di¢ culty is how to dene a labor market segment or submarket.
A submarket of the labor market is dened as a subset of unemployed workers or vacant
jobs that are similar to each other but di¤erent from other workers or jobs, so that each
unemployed worker and each rm with a vacant job searches in one submarket only. In
our theoretical framework, we assumed that submarkets are mutually exclusive, so that
two workers that are searching for some of the same jobs are searching for all of the same
jobs, and if a worker is searching for a job, then that job is searching for that worker. In
practice, these assumptions are likely to be violated, unless we dene submarkets as very
small and homogeneous segments of the labor markets, based on geographic location as
well as the skill set required to do a job.
We use 50 US states to explore geographic mismatch and around 33 industries to
explore skill mismatch.14 This choice is driven by data limitations and follows other
empirical contributions in this literature (S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), Bar-
nichon and Figura (2013)). Unfortunately, it is not possible to use very small sub-
markets, because we would have too little data about each submarket.15 It is also not
possible to use occupations, as S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) do, even though
occupations arguably better describe categories of jobs that require similar skills than
industries, because data on prots by occupation are not available.
3.1 Data Sources
Our primary data sources are the January 1979 to December 2009 basic monthly les of
the Current Population Survey (CPS) administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). We limit the sample to wage and salary workers between 16 and 65 years of age,
with non-missing data for state and industry classication. From the matched basic
monthly les we construct job nding and separation rates, using the variable labor
14For the state-level data, we exclude Alaska, which has extreme wages and prots, and include DC.
For the industry-level data, we have 33 industries based on the SIC classication for the 1983-1997
period and 32 industries based on the NAICS classication for the 2003-2009 period.
15Shimer (2007), for instance, suggests using the interaction of 800 occupations and 922 geographic
areas (362 MSAs plus 560 rural areas), which gives a total of 740; 000 submarkets. In our dataset, we
have information on about 150; 000 workers in a given year, so that we would have 1 datapoint for each
5 submarkets.
14
force status, which indicates which workers are unemployed and which are employed.
We aggregate the monthly data to an annual time series in order to increase the number
of observations. Our estimates of nding and separation rates are based on about 23; 000
and 500; 000 observations per year, respectively. From the outgoing rotation groups, we
get wages, calculated as usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. Again,
we aggregate the data to an annual time series, ending up with a sample of about
150; 000 workers per year. Table 2 in appendix F lists the states and industries we
use and summarizes the number of observations used to calculate the job nding rate
and the average wage for the state-year and industry-year cells. The average cell size
for job nding rates is 569 per year for the state-level data and 679 per year for the
industry-level data and the smallest cells have 158 and 102 observations respectively.
Data on prots by state and industry come from the National Income and Product
Account (NIPA) data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use
gross operating surplus per employee as our measure of prots. Gross operating surplus
equals value added, net of taxes and subsidies, minus compensation of employees. Net
operating surplus equals gross operating surplus minus consumption of xed capital and
is the measure of business income from the NIPA that is closest to economic prots.
Since data on net operating surplus are not available at the state and industry level, we
use gross operating surplus, thus e¤ectively assuming that xed capital does not di¤er
much across labor market segments. Under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology and perfect capital markets, prots per employee equal the marginal
prots from hiring an additional worker.16 We drop the industries Mining, Utilities,
Real estate and rental and leasingand Petroleum and coal products manufacturing
because reported prots are extremely large in these industries.
In 1998, the industry classication system changes from the SIC to the NAICS.
Using a consistent industry classication over the entire sample period would force us
to aggregate at a higher level. Instead, we use the SIC classication until 1997 and the
NAICS from 1998 onwards, using approximately the same number of industries in both
subsamples. This allows us to calculate comparable cross-industry variances for f^Wi ,
f^Fi , S^
W
i and S^
F
i over the full sample period. The only problem with this approach is
that the change in classication may introduce jumps in the variances in 1998 because
of sampling error (although the industries are subsamples of the data with on average
the same size before and after 1998, they are di¤erent draws). We solve this problem by
imposing that the variances may change smoothly over time but may not jump in 1998.
We implement this by regressing the squares of the four variables on a polynomial time
trend and a post-1998 dummy. Because all variables are in deviations from their mean,
the average of the square equals the variance and the polynomial trend captures smooth
16Let Y = AKL1  be output, produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology from capital
K and labor L. Prots (or net operating surplus) are given by  = Y   rK   wL, where r is the
rental rate of capital and w is the wage rate. The marginal prots from an additional employee are
d=dL = (1  )Y=L w, where dK=dL = 0 by the envelope theorem if capital is chosen optimally by
the rm. Prots per employee are =L = Y=L  rK=L w. If capital markets are frictionless, then the
rental rate equals the marginal product of capital, r = Y=K, so that =L = (1  )Y=L w = d=dL.
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changes in this variance. We then correct the post-1998 data for the estimated jump in
the variance.
We use nominal data on wages and prots and do not use a price deator in our
baseline estimates. The reason is that if we were to use an aggregate series for the
deator, this would not a¤ect our results, which use only the cross-sectional variation
in the data. As a robustness check, we also show results for unemployment due to
geographic mismatch using a state-specic deator provided by Berry, Fording, and
Hanson (2000), which is available until 2007.
Finally, we need to make assumptions on unemployment benets (including the util-
ity from leisure) bWit , vacancy posting costs  bFit , the discount rate r and the elasticity
of the matching function . In our baseline results, we assume the replacement ra-
tio bWit =wit equals 0:73, which is the value preferred by Hall (2009) and Nagypál and
Mortensen (2007). We explore the robustness of our results to setting the replacement
ratio to 0:4 (as in Shimer (2005)) or 0:95 (as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)), as well
as to allowing for the replacement ratio to vary across states according to the weekly
benet amounts published by the U.S. Department of Labor (2010). We assume  = 0:6
in our baseline results, again following Nagypál and Mortensen (2007), and explore ro-
bustness to setting  = 0:5 or  = 0:7, the lower and upper bound of the plausible
range of estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We set the annual discount rate
r = 0:04 and vacancy posting costs  bFit=it = 0:03, but these assumptions matter very
little for the results.
3.2 Finding Rates
We calculate job nding rates of workers from Current Populations Survey as the number
of workers whose status changes from unemployed to employed as a fraction of the total
number of unemployed workers in a submarket.17 Workers are attributed to the state
where they live and the industry where they work. Unemployed workers, who do not
work and therefore have no information about industry, are attributed to the industry
where they last held a job, following standard practice at the BLS.
To calculate worker nding rates of rms, we would need rm-level data, which are
available from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), but only from the
year 2000 onwards. To obtain data on worker nding rates for a longer sample period,
we give up on testing equation (5) and impose this equation holds with MTi = 0 for all i.
Then, we use this relation to construct data for worker nding rates of rms fFi from data
on job nding rates of workers fWi . Although second-best, we prefer this solution over
limiting the time period, mostly because a longer time series is important for studying
mismatch over the business cycle, but also because heterogeneity in matching e¢ ciency
is arguably the least interesting of the four sources of labor market mismatch. Our
17This is a common way to measure worker ows, see Shimer (2012). There are several reasons why
the level of worker ows constructed in this way is biased, like measurement error (Abowd and Zellner
(1985)) and time aggregation bias. Since we use only worker ows in deviations from the average across
submarkets, these biases should not a¤ect our results.
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choice is further supported by the evidence from the JOLTS reported in S¸ahin, Song,
Topa, and Violante (2014). S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) estimate submarket-
specic matching e¢ ciency by regressing matches on unemployment and vacancies. They
nd that while there is substantial variation in matching e¢ ciency, this seems to not
a¤ect the amount of mismatch. If there is mismatch coming from heterogeneity in the
matching technology, then this will not alter our estimates of the level and cyclical
behavior of mismatch unemployment, but it will a¤ect the decomposition of mismatch
into its sources.18
3.3 Match Surplus
We assumed that matches in submarket i are formed by combining an unemployed
worker and a vacant job, both of which were searching in submarket i. If we further
assume that when matches are destroyed, both worker and vacancy remain in submarket
i, at least initially, then the surplus of match in submarket i must satisfy the following
Bellman equation,
(1 + r)Sit = yit + Et [(1  it+1)Sit+1] (8)
where Sit may be worker or rm surplus, yit is the ow payo¤ from the match (to worker
or rm) and it is turnover in submarket i.
We observe match payo¤s yit and turnover it in our dataset. For the worker, payo¤s
yWit equal wages minus unemployment benets and the disutility from working, and
turnover equals the separation rate it plus the job nding rate, Wit = it + f
W
it . For
the rm, payo¤s from a lled job yFit equal prots gross of vacancy posting costs, and
turnover equals the separation rate plus the worker nding rate, Fit = it + f
F
it . We
use these data and equation (8) to calculate match surplus for the worker and rm,
SWit and S
F
it respectively. In the context of the standard search and matching model,
it is straightforward to derive equation (8) from the Bellman equations for workers and
rms, see appendix C.1.
For our exercise, what matters is the dispersion in surplus across submarkets of
the labor markets. Dispersion in surplus is sensitive to the persistence in payo¤s and
turnover. The persistence of payo¤s matters because match surplus equals the expected
net present value of all future payo¤s from the match. If payo¤s are very persistent, then
current payo¤ di¤erentials will persist into the future, thus generating more dispersion
in the expected net present value. Persistence in turnover matters because it determines
to what extent turnover is segment-specic. Segment-specic turnover introduces a
negative correlation between surplus and turnover across segments, pushing towards the
correlation expected in the WM and JM curves.
18The direction of the bias is not clear. If, for example, states with high job nding rates tend to have
higher matching e¢ ciency, MTi > 0, we would tend to underestimate the worker nding rate in those
states, see equation (5). This would then bias our estimates of the job mobility frictions, see equation
(3). Whether we would over- or underestimate the contribution of these frictions would depend on
whether states with high job nding rates tend to have higher or lower than average prots.
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We assume payo¤s and turnover follow autoregressive process that reverts to the
average across all submarkets.
yit+1 = (1  y) yit + yyt + "y;it+1 ) Etyit+s = yt + (1  y)s (yit   yt) (9)
it+1 = (1   ) it +  t + ";it+1 ) Etit+s = t + (1   )s (it   t) (10)
By varying the parameters y and  , we explore the robustness of our results to the
amount of persistence in match payo¤s and turnover. In the baseline results, we assume
the processes for payo¤s yit and turnover it are independent.
The rst-order autocorrelation in wages is 0:99 per year in the state-level data and
0:94 in the industry-level data based on the NAICS classication.19 This is consistent
with Blanchard and Katz (1992), who nd an autocorrelation of 0:94 across US states,
and Alvarez and Shimer (2011), who nd 0:90 for 75 industries at the 3-digit level of
disaggregation (CES data, 1990-2008), and conclude that wages are nearly a random
walk. Autocorrelation in prots is lower, but still 0:99 in the state-level data and 0:65
in the industry-level data. In our baseline results, we assume wages and prots are a
random walk, y = 0, but our results are robust to a higher degree of mean-reversion.20
The rst-order autocorrelation in turnover is 0:61 per year in the state level data and
0:50 in the industry-level data. Although turnover seems to be further from a random
walk than payo¤s, we still use the random walk assumption as our baseline. However, in
section 4.4 we explore the robustness of our results to higher degrees of mean-reversion.
Using stochastic processes (9) and (10), we can solve equation (8) recursively to
obtain match surplus. For convenience, we approximate around turnover being a random
walk so that we can obtain an explicit expression for the solution, see appendix C.2 for
the derivation. The approximation will be good for relatively small deviations of  from
our baseline value of zero.
Sit ' (r + it) (r + it +  )
(r + it) (r + it +  ) +  (1 + r + it) (t   it)

yt
r + it
+
yit   yt
r + it + y

(11)
If match payo¤s follow a random walk, y = 0, and turnover is constant,  = 0, as in
our baseline, then match surplus is the annuity value of the current payo¤, Sit =
yit
r+it
,
evaluated at an e¤ective discount rate which includes not only the rate of time preference,
but also the turnover rate. The higher the wage in a submarket, the higher is the surplus
of having a job in that submarket. The more likely it is to lose that job in the future 
that is, the higher is it and therefore it the lower is the surplus. Also, the easier it
is for an unemployed person in this market to nd a job the higher fWit and therefore
19We report simple rst-order autocorrelations in this paragraph. However, the persistence in the
data is very similar and if anything higher if we use the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable in
a dynamic panel regression with xed-e¤ects.
20Strictly speaking, what matters is not the persistence in average wages and prots, but the per-
sistence of wages and prots of a given match. However, as shown by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens
(2013) and Kudlyak (2011), wages paid out over the duration of a match are more persistent than
average wages, so if anything these estimates understate the autocorrelation in wages.
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it the smaller is the advantage of already having a job.
Some assumptions were needed to derive expression (11) for match surplus in addi-
tion to the ones discussed above. Implicit in Bellman equation (8) are the assumptions
that workers cannot vary their search e¤ort and that they cannot search while holding
a job. Endogenous search e¤ort and on-the-job search would change the expression for
surplus, but cannot explain our results, see the discussion in section 4.5. Implicit in the
stochastic processes for match payo¤s (9) and turnover (10) is the assumption that these
processes are independent. In particular, we may be concerned that turnover depends
on payo¤s because of endogenous match destruction. We will explore the robustness of
our results if this is the case, see section 4.4. Finally, in the calculation of match pay-
o¤s themselves, we assume the replacement ratio is constant across segments, implicitly
assuming that unemployment benets and/or the value of leisure depend positively on
wages. We will explore the robustness of our results to this assumption as well.
3.4 Heterogeneity
We estimate mismatch unemployment from the dispersion in wages, prots and nding
rates. Heterogeneity is a concern, because it may generate dispersion that is unrelated
to mismatch. Our benchmark conditions were derived assuming all workers and jobs are
the same. In reality , wages, prots and even job nding rates may vary across workers
not only because of deviations from these conditions, but also because workers have
di¤erent education, experience or other characteristics. If we do not control for these
di¤erences, we may spuriously attribute the dispersion they generate as mismatch.
In our baseline results, we do not control for heterogeneity. There are three reasons
for this. First, we will nd that the data show remarkably small deviations from our
benchmark worker and job mobility curves. Since worker and rm heterogeneity would
tend to generate deviations from these conditions, we interpret this as evidence that
heterogeneity seems to largely average outbetween states and industries. Second, there
is a price to pay for controlling for heterogeneity: we can no longer estimate the overall
level of mismatch unemployment. However, we do check the robustness of our results
about the cyclicality and the sources of mismatch. If anything, these results become
stronger when we control for worker and job heterogeneity, which is the third reason
why we feel comfortable ignoring heterogeneity in the baseline. Results controlling for
heterogeneous workers and rms are reported in section 4.4 along with a number of other
robustness checks. However, because of the importance of this particular robustness
check, we describe it here, before turning to the results.
Di¤erences across workers are to large degree observable. Our approach to deal
with this type of heterogeneity is to calculate surplus and nding rates for homogeneous
groups of workers and then to average the values we get for S^Wi , S^
F
i , f^
W
i and f^
F
i over
all groups of workers. We use 40 groups of homogeneous workers based on all observable
worker characteristics in our dataset: education, experience, gender, race and marital
status, see appendix D.1 for details. Our results change very little if we do this. However,
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as one may still be concerned about unobservable di¤erences across workers and more
importantly across rms, we pursue a second approach of controlling for heterogeneity
as well.
There are other di¤erences between jobs than just the wage. In particular, residual
wage di¤erentials have been interpreted as compensating di¤erentials: non-monetary job
amenities like exible hours or safe working conditions, in return for which workers are
willing to accept lower wages, see Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).21 These di¤erences
are completely unobservable in our dataset. Therefore, as our second approach to deal
with heterogeneity, we assume compensating di¤erences are constant over time and re-
move the time-series average of the values for S^Wi , S^
F
i , f^
W
i and f^
F
i in each year. Details
on this procedure, which is similar in spirit to a xed-e¤ects regression, are in appendix
D.2. The advantage of this approach is that it controls for all time-invariant hetero-
geneity, observable as well as unobservable and across workers as well as across rms.
The disadvantage is that we can no longer estimate the size of the deviations from our
benchmark conditions, but only their relative size compared to the time-series averages.
As a result, equation (7) no longer gives the correct level of the unemployment rate that
is due to mismatch. We do show, however, that our results regarding the cyclicality and
decomposition of mismatch are not only robust to controlling for heterogeneity, but in
fact look even stronger than the baseline results.
4 Results
We start the description of our results by exploring how well our benchmark conditions
(2), (3) and (4) hold in the data. Then, we present our estimates for mismatch unem-
ployment resulting from deviations of these conditions in section 4.2.1, and explore its
behavior over the business cycle in section 4.2.2. Finally, in section 4.3, we present the
results of our mismatch accounting exercise decomposing mismatch unemployment into
the contribution of each of its three sources.
4.1 Benchmark Relations
Figure 2 shows scatterplots for states around the worker mobility, job mobility and
wage determination curves. These graphs are for 2000, but look similar for other years.
Deviations across states from worker mobility condition (2) and job mobility condition
(3) are small and non-systematic. On the other hand, there are large and systematic
deviations from the benchmark wage determination curve (4).
These graphs suggest that mobility of workers and jobs across states seems to be
su¢ cient to arbitrage away most di¤erences in the values of being unemployed and
having a vacancy across states, a nding that we will conrm in the accounting exercise
in Section 4.3. Mismatch is primarily due to variation across states in the share of match
21One of these compensating di¤erentials is explicitly taken into account in our calculations, which is
the separation probability. However, this is only one of many unobservable di¤erences between jobs.
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surplus that is attributed to workers versus rms. If workers and rms were to share
surplus in xed proportions, as in benchmark wage determination condition (4), then
states that are attractive to rms are attractive to workers as well. If total match surplus
varies across states, for example because labor productivity is di¤erent in di¤erent states,
this maps out the benchmark wage determination condition. In reality, it seems that
di¤erences in wages across states are much larger than di¤erences in labor productivity.
Since states with high wages generate high surplus for workers but low surplus for rms,
this generates mismatch as rms with vacancies and unemployed workers move away
from each other.
Figure 3 shows similar results for the benchmark conditions across industries. The
worker mobility plot looks qualitatively similar to that for states. This is in line with
high rates of worker mobility across industries found in PSID data, see Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008). Barriers to job mobility seem to play a role in mismatch across
industries, but deviations from the benchmark wage determination curve are large and
systematic as well. In Section 4.3 we will show that the importance of barriers to job
mobility depends on the time period, but throughout the sample variation in the surplus
share of workers is an important source of mismatch across industries as well, although
less important than for mismatch across states.
The patterns in the data that we reveal are surprising to many, possibly because most
of the debate about labour market mismatch has focused on worker mobility frictions, see
e.g. Kocherlakota (2010), Frey (2009), Katz (2010), Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2011)
and S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014). Moreover, the evidence that restrictions
to worker mobility seem to not contribute at all to mismatch is very striking and the
correlation in the scatter plots looks almost too good to be true. One might think,
therefore, that there is something in our treatment of the data that spuriously generates
these patterns or that we make convenient assumptions that make the results look
stronger than they really are. We will try to convince the reader that this is not the
case with an extensive robustness analysis, discussed in section 4.4, and we will discuss
the question what may explain our results in section 4.5. First, however, we complete
the description of the results by exploring how important mismatch is as a source of
unemployment, and by formalizing the nding that mismatch is primarily driven by
deviations of wage determination from the benchmark condition, both in terms of the
average level of mismatch and for uctuations in mismatch over time.
4.2 Mismatch Unemployment
Figure 4 plots the unemployment rate that is due to mismatch across states over the
1979-2009 period. Figure 5 shows a similar graph for mismatch across industries. These
counterfactual unemployment rates were constructed using the observed dispersion in
job nding rates as explained in section 2.2. For comparison, the graphs also show the
actual unemployment rate over the same period, although on a di¤erent scale on the
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right-hand side axis of the graphs.22
We will use the series in these graphs to address the questions how large is the
impact of labor market mismatch on unemployment and how does it uctuate over the
business cycle. Estimating the impact of mismatch on unemployment is complicated by
the fact that the level of disaggregation matters. We discuss this issue in section 4.2.1
below. However, it is worth noting that the similarity in the uctuations in mismatch
and overall unemployment are striking. We return to this in section 4.2.2 where we
discuss the cyclicality of mismatch.
4.2.1 Level of Mismatch Unemployment
Our measure of the contribution of labor market mismatch to unemployment is simply
the ratio of the average mismatch unemployment over the average actual unemploy-
ment rate over our full sample period. In Figure 4, unemployment due to mismatch
across states averages around 0:1%-points compared to an average unemployment rate
of around 5%. Mismatch across states contributes 2:3% to the overall unemployment
rates according to these estimates. The estimates in Figure 5 show that mismatch across
across industries contributes around 2:1% to unemployment. Taken at face value, the
contribution of mismatch to unemployment seems very small. However, clearly the level
of disaggregation matters for the observed amount of mismatch. Since there is likely
to be substantial mismatch within states and within industries, we underestimate the
contribution of mismatch to unemployment.
We try to address the aggregation issue in two ways. First, we disaggregate further.
For the purposes of this subsection only, we use data that are disaggregated by both
state and industry. Instead of 50 states or 33 industries, this gives us 5033 = 1650 labor
market segments. Although 1650 submarkets is probably a more realistic segmentation
of the US labor market, it is in all likelihood still to coarse. Therefore, the second part of
our solution is to nd a correction factor that relates the observed amount of mismatch
in our data to the amount of mismatch we would observe if we were to disaggregate to
the right level.
An ideal labor market segment would consist of very similar jobs within a geographic
area that allows workers to commute to these jobs without moving house. Using UK
data, Barnichon and Figura (2013) estimate the correct level of disaggregation would
be to use 232 so-called travel-to-work areas and 353 detailed occupational groups. They
then aggregate these data to a level that is comparable to US states and major occupa-
tional categories and nd that the observed amount of mismatch decreases by a factor
6. Thus, we will correct the observed amount of mismatch unemployment in the data
that are disaggregated by both states and industries by multiplying our estimates with
6. Appendix E describes the justication for this correction.
22 In this graph, as well as in all other graphs in the paper, the overallor totalunemployment rate
is the steady state unemployment rate corresponding to the average nding and separation rates across
states or industries. This steady state unemployment rate, which is comparable to our estimates for
structural unemployment, is very close to the actual unemployment rate.
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Disaggregation by both states and industries, while alleviating the aggregation prob-
lem, gives rise to a di¤erent bias because of sampling error. Barnichon and Figura (2013)
use a very large dataset consisting of the universe of job seekers in the UK. The US data,
however, are survey-based and in our dataset we have only about 23; 000 unemployed
workers per year, which means that the 1650 labor market segments on average contain
only 14 observations and because not all states and industries are equally large, some
cells are even much smaller than that. As a result, our estimates for the job nding rate
in each segment will be very imprecise. This sampling error will translate into dispersion
across segments and bias our estimate for the amount of mismatch unemployment. We
address this issue by estimating the variance of the sampling error in each segment and
correcting the estimated variance of the job nding rates by subtracting the average
variance of the sampling error, see appendix E for more details.23
Mismatch across state*industry segments contributes 15% to unemployment, sub-
stantially more than mismatch across states or industries only. The bias because of
sampling error is fairly small, bringing the contribution of mismatch down to 14%, in-
dicating the dispersion in job nding rates across segments is large compared to the
sampling error. After correcting for aggregation, these estimates suggest that mismatch
is responsible for 84% of unemployment.24 It is important to note that a good amount
of guesswork was needed for the aggregation correction and the estimate is therefore
rather imprecise. Nevertheless, these estimates indicate that it is at least a possibility
that mismatch is an important contributor to unemployment and that potentially even
the majority of unemployment may be due to mismatch.
Our estimates are, roughly, in line with S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), who
using very di¤erent datand that geographic mismatch is very small, but industry-
level mismatch (at the two-digit level) explains around 14% of the increase in unemploy-
ment in the Great Recession. Although they do not report this in the text, the estimates
in their Figure 3 imply a similar contribution of mismatch to the level of unemployment.
Consistent with our argument that aggregation importantly biases the estimate of the
contribution of mismatch, S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) also nd that when
they disaggregate further, to three-digit occupation level, the contribution of mismatch
increases to 29%. However, we emphasize that our estimates of the contribution of mis-
match to the level of unemployment are very rough and the estimates in S¸ahin, Song,
Topa, and Violante (2014) are the more credible ones. The contribution of the current
study is in the estimates of the cyclicality of mismatch and its sources, to which we now
turn.
23Workers in each segment nd a job with probability fWi . The variance of the realization of this
Bernoulli process equals fWi
 
1  fWi

, so that the variance of the observed mean probability is equal to
fWi
 
1  fWi

=Ni, where Ni is the number of observations in segment i. The variance of the signal in
fWi across segments, by the ANOVA formula, is then given by the observed variance var
 
fWi

minus
the average variance of the sampling error E

fWi
 
1  fWi

=Ni

. We do not use segments with less than
5 observations because these would contribute more noise than signal.
24These estimates are summarized in Table 3 in appendix F.
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4.2.2 Cyclicality of Mismatch Unemployment
Figures 4 and 5 clearly show that the cyclical uctuations in mismatch unemployment
are very similar to those of the overall unemployment rate. Mismatch unemployment
closely follows the business cycles in the overall unemployment rate. Mismatch rises in
the 1982, 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions, declining slowly during the recovery as does the
unemployment rate. The relative amplitude of these uctuations is very similar to those
in the total unemployment rate. There is no evidence that mismatch unemployment is
less cyclical or more persistent than the overall unemployment rate. Finally, there is no
indication that the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession was more than in
other recessions due to mismatch.
The volatility of the two series is not directly comparable, unless we correct for
aggregation bias discussed above in section 4.2.1. To obtain a summary statistic for
the importance of mismatch to the overall unemployment rate, we regress mismatch
unemployment on a constant and the overall unemployment rate in deviation from its
average.
uMMt = 0u+ 1 (ut   u) (12)
The intercept in this regression after correcting for aggregation biasmeasures the
contribution of mismatch to the average level of unemployment, which we reported in
section 4.2.1, whereas the slope coe¢ cient measures the contribution of mismatch to
uctuations in unemployment.25
Our estimates for the contribution of mismatch to uctuations in unemployment are
somewhat similar to our estimates for the contribution to the level of unemployment:
3:4% for mismatch across states (cf. 2:3% of the level) and 1:2% for mismatch across
industries (cf. 2:1% of the level). After a rough correction for aggregation bias, as ex-
plained in Section 4.2.1 above, these estimates imply that mismatch may be responsible
for a large part to all of uctuations in unemployment (precisely, the estimates range
from 48 to 136%, but as mentioned before should be expected to be very imprecise).
These results suggest that unemployment may to a large extent be due to labor
market mismatch. It is important to note that there is nothing in our estimation proce-
dure that would introduce a comovement of mismatch unemployment with the overall
unemployment rate by construction. In fact, all our estimates are relative to the cross-
sectional mean in each year, so we explicitly remove any aggregate uctuations from our
data. The fact that we nd such strong comovement therefore seems to suggest that we
may think of mismatch as a micro-foundation for search frictions in the tradition of
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985).26
25The contribution to uctuations 1 = corr
 
uMMt ; ut

sd
 
uMMt

=sd (ut) depends not only on the
correlation, but also on the relative standard deviation of the two series, which is why the same correction
for aggregation bias is appropriate.
26Pissarides (2000) describes search frictions as a modeling device that captures the implications
of the costly trading process without the need to make the heterogeneity and the other features that
give rise to it explicit(p.4). Our mismatch accounting framework makes the underlying heterogeneity
explicit and allows us to explore the causes of this heterogeneity.
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4.3 Sources of Mismatch
We now turn to the part of our results that is arguably the most interesting: the
decomposition of mismatch unemployment into the sources of the mismatch. From
section 4.1 we know that benchmark conditions for worker mobility and job mobility
approximately hold in the data, whereas there are large and systematic deviations from
the benchmark condition for wage determination. This suggests that most mismatch is
driven by wage setting. Here, we formalize that conclusion.
Figures 6 and 7 show the results of our mismatch accounting exercise described in
section 2.3. The gures show the evolution over time of mismatch unemployment as
well as its three sources, for mismatch across states and industries respectively.
Mismatch unemployment due to wage setting frictions alone closely tracks total
unemployment due to mismatch across states, see Figure 6, reecting the fact that
variation in the share of match surplus that is captured by wage earners is the most im-
portant impediment to equalization of job nding rates across states. The contribution
of deviations from free mobility of workers and jobs is very small and largely acycli-
cal. Removing any frictions to geographic worker or job mobility, while leaving existing
wage determination mechanisms in place, would reduce unemployment very little and
might even increase it.27 For mismatch across industries the picture is slightly more
complicated, see Figure 7. The contribution of worker mobility frictions is again very
small, but the contribution of barriers to job mobility seems to increase over the sample.
Wage determination is the most important source of mismatch in the rst half of the
sample, but its importance declines since the 1990s and becomes particularly small or
even negative in the Great Recession.
To summarize the contribution of each source of mismatch to the unemployment
rate, we regress unemployment due to each source on the total unemployment rate due
to mismatch (in deviation from its mean).
uXXt = 
XX
0 u
MM + XX1
 
uMMt   uMM

(13)
where XX stands for the source of mismatch, i.e. XX 2 fWM;JM;WDg. The inter-
cept in this regression measures the contribution of each of the frictions to the average
level of mismatch unemployment, so that XX0 = u
XX=uMM , whereas the slope coe¢ -
27How can the contribution of barriers to worker mobility to unemployment be negative? The answer
is related to the correlations between the deviations from the worker mobility curve (2), the job mobility
curve (3) and the wage determination curve (4). States with high worker surplus and low job surplus
because of relatively high worker bargaining power, i.e. states with high WDi , tend to attract unem-
ployed workers and loose jobs, resulting in a lower than average job nding rate and higher than average
worker nding rate in that state, everything else equal. However, the same states tend to have low WMi
and JMi , meaning frictions to worker and job mobility costs tend to keep more unemployed workers
and vacancies in the state than we would expect based on worker and job surplus there. The barriers to
worker mobility reduce job nding rates, reinforcing the e¤ect of the high wage, but the barriers to job
mobility costs reduce worker nding rates as well, partially o¤setting the e¤ect. These conclusions are
interesting in terms of their policy implication. The e¤ects on the unemployment rate of a policy that
reduces worker mobility costs, for example relocation or retraining subsidies to unemployed workers, are
likely to be small and may even be negative.
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cient measures the contribution of mismatch to uctuations in unemployment. The slope
coe¢ cient captures both the degree of correlation of unemployment due to a particular
source of mismatch with the total mismatch unemployment rate and the size of uctua-
tions in mismatch due to that source, i.e. XX1 = corr
 
uXXt ; u
MM
t

sd
 
uXXt

=sd
 
uMMt

.
Note that because uWMt + u
JM
t + u
WD
t = u
MM
t , the contributions of the three sources
to the total add up to one, i.e. WM0 + 
JM
0 + 
WD
0 = 1 and 
WM
1 + 
JM
1 + 
WD
1 = 1,
so that this is a true decomposition.
Frictions to worker mobility contribute 6% to the level of and 15% to the uctuations
in mismatch across states and 10% to the level and 2% to the uctuations of mismatch
across industries. Barriers to job mobility account for none of the mismatch across
states (0% of the level and 1% of the uctuations), but for a substantial part of the
level of mismatch across industries (48%) and all of the uctuations (113%), although
as already pointed out the summary statistics hide a clear change over time in the
importance of this type of frictions to mismatch unemployment. As a result, variation
in the share of match surplus that is paid out to workers in the form of wages accounts
for almost all of the level and uctuations in mismatch across states (93% and 83%,
respectively), a good share of the level of mismatch across industries (64%), but none
of the uctuations in industry-level mismatch ( 11%).
4.4 Robustness
A number of assumptions were necessary to construct the data needed for our analysis.
In this subsection we explore the robustness of our results to these assumptions. We
summarize the results in terms of the contribution of mismatch to the level and uctua-
tions of the overall unemployment rate, as explained in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, and the
contribution of barriers to worker mobility, barriers to job mobility and deviations from
the benchmark wage determination equation to labor market mismatch, as described in
Section 4.3. These summary statistics are presented for a number of robustness checks
in Table 1. The rst line in the top and bottom panels of this table shows our baseline
estimates for state-level and industry-level data respectively.
For the construction of job lling rates from job nding rates, we made the as-
sumption that the matching technology is well described by a Cobb-Douglas matching
function with an elasticity of unemployment  of 0:6, see Sections 2.1.4 and 3.2. The
second and third line in the table shows the e¤ect of assuming an elasticity of 0:5 or
0:7. A higher (lower) elasticity increases (decreases) the concavity of the aggregate job
nding rate in the segment-specic job nding rates, see equation (7), and therefore
increases (decreases) the estimated contribution of mismatch to unemployment. This
e¤ect is fairly strong, but for the (commonly accepted) range of values for  considered,
the result that mismatch is an important contributor to unemployment does not change
qualitatively. A higher elasticity also increases the dispersion in job lling rates given
the same job nding rates and therefore attributes more of a role to wage determination
and less to job mobility frictions as a source of mismatch. This e¤ect is small, however.
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For the construction of match surpluses, we made a number of choices, see Section
3.3, among which the assumption that the replacement ratio equals 0:73, price deators
are the same across states, and the assumption that match payo¤s (wages or prots)
follow a random walk and match turnover is constant. Lines 4 through 10 explore the
robustness of our results to these assumptions. Since none of these assumptions a¤ect the
observed dispersion in job nding rates, the estimates of the contribution of mismatch to
unemployment are not a¤ected at all, except for the state-specic price deators, which
generate slightly more dispersion and therefore a slightly higher estimate of mismatch
unemployment. The composition of mismatch into its sources is a¤ected, but the e¤ects
are small. The only exception is mean-reversion in match turnover, which generates a
larger role for worker and job mobility frictions. We cannot rule out, therefore, that
these frictions are more important than our baseline estimates suggest. Even with mean
reversion of 50% per year, however, deviations from the benchmark wage determination
curve are a very important source of mismatch across states, whereas the nding that
job mobility frictions are the most important source of mismatch across industries is
actually strengthened with respect to the baseline estimates.
For some assumptions, we cannot directly explore robustness, but we can argue they
are unlikely to a¤ect our ndings. Measurement error, while substantial, clearly does
not drive our results. Classical measurement error would generate non-systematic devi-
ations from all benchmark relations, whereas we clearly nd the worker and job mobility
curves in the data, and deviations from the wage determination benchmark condition
are systematic. A similar argument can be made for on-the-job search. If workers are
searching for a new job while employed, this increases workersmatch surplus, but given
observed wages and job nding rates, this e¤ect is not taken into account in the way we
construct match surplus, see section 3.3. If on-the-job search intensity is the same for all
workers and all rms, then this does not a¤ect our results, because we work in deviations
from the cross-sectional mean. If on-the-job search intensity varies systematically with
the value of a match, then on-the-job search would increase or decrease the slope of the
worker mobility curve, (mis)leading us to conclude that worker mobility frictions are
giving rise to mismatch. Since we nd very little evidence for the importance of worker
mobility frictions, it seems unlikely that the results would change much if we allowed for
on-the-job search. For the same reason, our ndings cannot be driven by workers looking
for jobs in surrounding regions and occupations as Marinescu and Rathelot (2014) show
they do, because this e¤ect would also push against nding a worker mobility condition
in the data.
A more serious issue is that of discouraged workers. It is possible that unemployed
workers leave labor market segments with low surplus (wages), not by moving to a
di¤erent labor market segment, but by dropping out of the labor force. This mechanism
would make it seem like the no-arbitrage condition for worker mobility is satised, while
there is substantial mismatch, leading not to unemployment but to non-employment.
Without better data, there is unfortunately very little we can do to explore this issue,
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so we just mention it here as a caveat.
Finally, we explore the e¤ect of heterogeneity, as described in detail in Section 3.4.
Controlling for observed worker heterogeneity a¤ects the results remarkably little. If
anything, controlling for this type of heterogeneity makes mismatch across industries
look more important. When we control for unobserved heterogeneity by removing the
time series mean from all our data series, akin to controlling for xed e¤ects in a re-
gression, the importance of mismatch for unemployment seems to fall. This, however,
is by construction and should not be misinterpreted: by removing the average disper-
sion across states and industries we are removing part of the mismatch from the data.
The results of the mismatch accounting exercise are largely (and surprisingly) robust
to removing all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity from the data. The only thing
that changes when we control for observed worker heterogeneity or for all time-invariant
heterogeneity, is that we nd a larger role for deviations from the benchmark wage
determination curve for mismatch across industries, lending further relevance to our
earlier caveat that the overriding importance of barriers to job mobility for this type of
mismatch is hiding the fact that wage determination is important as well, especially in
the rst part of the sample.
4.5 Discussion
What may explain our ndings? We want to emphasize that we feel we have relatively
little to say about an explanation, because the approach we take in this paper is primarily
a (structured) exploration of the data. However, the question is interesting enough to
discuss at least briey. The nding that wage determination is an important source of
mismatch is driven by a negative correlation between wages and prots observed both
across states and across industries. This pattern in the data often comes as a surprise to
macroeconomists studying business cycles, because the time series correlation between
(aggregate) wages and prots is of course positive. However, upon reection, the negative
cross-sectional correlation is less surprising that it may seem at rst. Productivity does
not vary much across states and industries. This may the natural outcome of labor
mobility, in combination with diminishing returns to labor in the production function.
Given constant productivity, any increase in the wage constitutes a decrease in prots,
and vice versa, because surplus sharing is a zero-sum game.
What drives the observed variation in wages across states and industries if not pro-
ductivity di¤erentials? A natural candidate is di¤erences in bargaining power or outside
options across states and industries, e.g. caused by di¤erences in unionization rates. If
such di¤erences are roughly constant over time, then the data do not support this expla-
nation: when we control for time-invariant di¤erences, the systematic deviations from
the wage determination benchmark condition survive, and if anything get stronger, see
Table 1. But perhaps di¤erences in bargaining power or outside options trend slowly over
time.28 To explore this explanation, Figures 8 and 9 plots the evolution of worker surplus
28There may be good reasons to think this is the case. Non-wage employee compensation, for instance,
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and job nding rates over time for ve states and industries respectively. These states
and industries were chosen to be somewhat representative, while making the graphs easy
to read. States travel back and forth over the entire worker mobility curve, indicating
that this curve largely mapped out by relatively high-frequency variation in job nding
rates and wages within states over time. For industries the pictures is not quite as clear.
Over time, the within-industry variation maps out a section of the worker mobility curve,
but these movements are relatively small compared to the variation across industries,
suggesting that persistent di¤erence across industries also contribute to the dispersion
in job nding rates. This explains why controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (xed
e¤ects) a¤ects the estimates for industry-level mismatch more than it a¤ects the esti-
mates for mismatch across states. However, both movements over time and di¤erences
across industries seem to respect the worker mobility benchmark condition, making it
unlikely our results are primarily driving by low-frequency movements in institutions
a¤ecting wage determination. Finally, productivity or demand shocks to neighboring
segments may give rise to high-frequency state- and industry-specic variation in work-
ersoutside options. Such a channel would operate, for instance in the structural model
of Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013). However, this type of shocks would a¤ect rms
outside options as well and is therefore unlikely to explain our ndings.
One explanation that is consistent with our result, is that of di¤erential wage rigidity
across states and industries, in combination with aggregate shocks. Suppose that, in
response to a negative aggregate shock, wages in some occupations and therefore in
some states and industries stay roughly constant, whereas wages in other occupations
wages fall. As a result, the rigid-wage jobs are attractive to workers in a recession, and
unemployment increases as (too) many unemployed workers direct their search towards
these jobs. If we further assume that the rigid-wage jobs pay on average relatively low
wages, then we get that workers moving from high to low-wage jobs in recessions and
from low to high-wage jobs in booms, make the aggregate wage and the average wage
of newly hired workers exible, as we have found elsewhere, see Haefke, Sonntag, and
van Rens (2013). In the process, dispersion in labor market conditions moves almost
mechanically with aggregate uctuations, as we nd in this paper. We leave it for future
research to further explore this view of the e¤ect of aggregate uctuations on the labor
market.
5 Conclusions
Mismatch unemployment is unemployment due to dispersion in job nding rates across
submarkets of the labor market, which results in mismatch in the distribution of vacan-
cies and unemployed workers over submarkets. We proposed an accounting framework
using two arbitrage equations and a benchmark wage determination equation that allows
is not only state-specic, but changes substantially over our sample period. Similarly, school quality
and retirement benets vary both in the cross-section and over time.
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us to estimate mismatch unemployment and decompose it into its sources. Since this
framework takes data on the values of unemployment and vacancies rather than their
quantities as inputs, available data allowed us to present estimates for the 1979-2009
period, much further back in time that previous studies, in particular S¸ahin, Song, Topa,
and Violante (2014). This paper is also the rst to report on the causes of mismatch.
We nd that mismatch is an important reason for unemployment, in line with earlier
studies. The cyclical behavior of mismatch unemployment is very similar to that of
the overall unemployment rate. This nding is driven by the fact that dispersion in
labor market conditions across states and industries moves closely with the business
cycle. The unemployment that derives from this dispersion is as cyclical as the overall
unemployment rate and no more persistent. As a corollary, the nature of the increase in
unemployment in the Great Recession is no di¤erent from previous recessions, although
it is of course more severe.
The underlying frictions that cause mismatch to exist and persist are barriers to job
mobility (across industries) and deviations from surplus sharing in equal proportions
across industries and particularly across states. States with high wages tend to have
low prots. This implies that states and industries that are attractive to workers are
unattractive to rms and vice versa, generating dispersion in vacancy-unemployment
ratios and mismatch unemployment. Little to no mismatch derives from worker mobility
frictions. This nding is perhaps surprising in light of the debate on policies aimed at
increasing worker mobility.
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Table 1
Robustness Analysis
MMU Sources of MMU
level cycle level cycle
Mismatch across states WM JM WD WM JM WD
Baseline 2:3 3:4 6 0 93 15 1 83
Elasticity matching function,  = 0:5 1:6 2:4 8 5 88 20 10 70
____,  = 0:7 3:4 5:1 5  9 104 11  13 102
Flow payo¤ unemployment, b = 0:4 2:3 3:4 6 0 93 15 1 83
____, b = 0:9 2:3 3:4 6 0 93 15 1 83
State-specic deators 2:6 3:7 12  2 89 17 1 82
Mean-reversion payo¤s, y = 0:3 2:3 3:4 7 2 90 16 5 79
____, y = 0:5 2:3 3:4 8 3 89 16 6 77
Mean-reversion turnover,  = 0:3 2:3 3:4 23 39 47 27 26 47
____,  = 0:5 2:3 3:4 29 38 33 31 33 36
Control for observed worker heterogeneity 2:0 3:1 10 1 89 16 5 79
Control for unobserved heterogeneity 1:4 2:0 12 7 81 20 18 62
Mismatch across industries WM JM WD WM JM WD
Baseline 2:1 1:2  10 46 64  2 113  11
Elasticity matching function,  = 0:5 1:5 1:0  13 57 56 1 103  3
____,  = 0:7 3:0 1:6  6 21 86 0 88 12
Flow payo¤ unemployment, b = 0:4 2:1 1:2  10 46 64  2 113  11
____, b = 0:9 2:1 1:2  10 46 64  2 113  11
Mean-reversion payo¤s, y = 0:3 2:1 1:2  2 36 67 6 89 5
____, y = 0:5 2:1 1:2 0 34 66 7 76 17
Mean-reversion turnover,  = 0:3 2:1 1:2 11 61 28 18 114  32
____,  = 0:5 2:1 1:2 16 70 14 21 117  38
Control for observed worker heterogeneity 3:6 3:2  6 39 67 0 43 57
Control for unobserved heterogeneity 1:1 0:3 8 14 79 30 31 39
The contributions of mismatch to the level and cyclicality of unemployment is estimated
using the following regression, uMMt = 0u+ 1 (ut   u), where 0 = uMM=u measures
the contribution to the level and 1
 
= uMM=u

the contribution to uctuations
in unemployment. Similarly, the contributions of the various sources to mismatch are
estimated using uXXt = 
XX
0 u
MM + XX1
 
uMMt   uMM

, where XX stands for the
source, i.e. XX 2 fWM;JM;WDg.
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Figure 1
Sources of labor market mismatch
Figure 2
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage determination curves across US states
Lines represent the benchmark relations corresponding to a labor market without any
mismatch. Data are for 2000.
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Figure 3
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage determination curves across industries
Lines represent the benchmark relations corresponding to a labor market without any
mismatch. Data are for 2000.
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Figure 4
Cyclicality of mismatch unemployment across US states
Unemployment due to mismatch across US states, calculated as explained in 2.2. The
dashed line shows the actual unemployment rate for comparison (right-hand side axis).
Figure 5
Cyclicality of mismatch unemployment across industries
Unemployment due to mismatch across industries, calculated as explained in 2.2. The
dashed line shows the actual unemployment rate for comparison (right-hand side axis).
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Figure 6
Sources of labor market mismatch across US states
The solid line is our baseline estimate for mismatch unemployment, calculated as ex-
plained in 2.2. The other lines show the contribution of worker mobility costs (WM),
job mobility costs (JM) and wage setting frictions (WD) to mismatch, see 2.3.
Figure 7
Sources of labor market mismatch across industries
The solid line is our baseline estimate for mismatch unemployment, calculated as ex-
plained in 2.2. The other lines show the contribution of worker mobility costs (WM),
job mobility costs (JM) and wage setting frictions (WD) to mismatch, see 2.3.
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Figure 8
Mapping out the worker mobility curve across states
The graph shows the evolution of the job nding rate fWi and worker surplus S
W
i over
time in ve states: California, Texas, New York, Florida and Minnesota. Since this
graph is meant to be illustrative, these states were chosen partly based on size, but
also partly based on making the graph easier to read. However, the evolution of these
variables looks similar in other states.
Figure 9
Mapping out the worker mobility curve across industries
The graph shows the evolution of the job nding rate fWi and worker surplus S
W
i over
time in ve industries: construction, computer and electronics manufacturing, nance,
wholesale trade and retail trade. Since this graph is meant to be illustrative, these
industries were chosen because they are of particular interest for our story or particularly
large (wholesale and retail trade). However, the evolution of these variables looks similar
in other industries.
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